



Buddhist Models of Self: 
Politics when People Matter 
Georgios T. Halkias  
The Venerable Ānanda sat next to the Blessed One and addressed him:  
“Reverend Master, I have heard it said again and again ‘the world is empty, the 
world is empty.’ But in what sense is it said that the world is empty?” “Ānanda, 
it is because it is empty of self and anything belonging to self that the world is 
said to be empty.” (SN, III. 196) 
The Politics of the Consuming Self  
Many Buddhist texts recommend that a ruler best fit for public office is he who 
governs according to the precepts of dharma and exercises moderation and moral 
prudence in the domains of law and economy – not unlike the philosopher-King 
in Plato’s Republic who draws his authority from the maxim the knowing is wise 
and the wise is good.1 Plato and later Aristotle envisioned a political order immune 
to the superficial excesses of democracy in Athens. They directed their critiques 
at the shortcomings of a social system that placed its faith on “the majority’s 
ambivalence to a comprehensive social justice” that led to “political instability, 
often tending to war and tyranny and the lack of moral virtues.” In their view, 
democracy in Athens promoted “injustices occasioned by a superficial and selfish 
ethic of egalitarianism,” the “widespread pursuit of indolent pleasures,” and “the 
absence of genuine social and moral aims” (Corcoran, 1983: 16-17). 
                                                 
1 This view is eloquently summarized by Socrates in the Republic: “Until philosophers are kings, or 
the kings and princes of this world have the spirit and power of philosophy, and political greatness 
and wisdom meet in one, and those commoner natures who pursue either to the exclusion of the 
other are compelled to stand aside, cities will never rest from their evils, – no, nor the human race, as 
I believe, – and then only will this, our State have a possibility of life and behold the light of day” 
(Book V, 737). Plato’s famous metaphor in the Republic of the polis as a tripartite division of the soul 
clearly indicates some of the complexities involved in the process of organizing the state according to 
higher principles. For a discussion on Buddhist perspectives on kingship, see Halkias (2012). 
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The moral degradation of political life was a circular phenomenon, for the sort of 
popular leaders who possessed and profited from these vices supported in 
turnpolitical structures that legitimized their own interests. Although we may 
not necessarily side with the Greek philosophers’ solution to these problems, we 
can relate with their appraisal of the political ills of their times.  It is not my 
intention to add yet another critique to an ongoing instrumentalization of 
democratic principles by liberal capitalist regimes and political machines. Ever 
since economic prosperity has become the cornerstone, if not the whole edifice of 
public policy almost universally, people, communities and the physical 
environment are increasingly treated as resources, investments and potential 
capital. This utilitarian view of humanity and the natural world is reinforced by 
an equally debilitating and short-sighted vision of individualism perpetuated by 
social institutions, educational establishments, mass media, family settings and 
the global market. The universal promotion of an appetitive and selfish 
individual is built on the premise that the individual is the best, indeed the only 
qualified judge of its own interests, and therefore he should be entitled, 
encouraged and made as free as possible to fashion a life based on the 
gratification of desires and wants. Since the self is conceived and shaped in terms 
of appetites, wants and aversions, it comes to reflect the image of its greedy, 
unsatisfied, and immodest maker: the global market.  
Today we live in the age of so called ‘mass democracy,’ brandished and 
marketed in the media as the world’s ‘universal religion’ with its own production 
and reproduction of truths about human nature with an emphasis on associated 
rights such as, freedom of choice, equality, self-determination, and so forth, but 
regrettably with little discourse on the duties of individuals who are meant to 
represent and uphold such rights. In his critical studies, Michel Foucault 
challenged the mass mythology of the ‘individual self’ as it is invariably linked 
with the legitimization of political and economic exploitation processes in our 
societies, and with institutional regimes of domination. He writes:  
I think that if one wants to analyze the genealogy of the subject in 
Western civilization, he has to take into account not only techniques of 
domination but also techniques of the self… he has to take into account 
the interaction between those two types of techniques... He has to take 
into account the points where the technologies of domination of 
individuals over one another have recourse to processes by which the 
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individual acts upon himself. And conversely, he has to take into account 
the points where the techniques of the self are integrated into structures 
of coercion and domination. The contact point, where the individuals are 
driven by others is tied to the way they conduct themselves, is what we 
can call, I think government.2  
In my understanding, knowledge of the processes through which the self is 
constituted as a subject, however these are derived and explained, cannot be 
separated from the broader sphere of human culture and expression, including 
political awareness and economic action embedded in our views, language and 
actions. “Governing people, in the broad meaning of the word is not a way to 
force people to do what the governor wants; it is always a versatile equilibrium, 
with complementarity and conflicts between techniques which assure coercion 
and processes through which the self is constructed or modified by himself.”3 
Inspired by Foucault’s critique, in the following paper I wish to frame some of 
the economic, environmental and social problems that we face today because of 
unhealthy and unviable models of individuality and gear the discussion on 
alternative ‘cultures of self,’ which directly or indirectly challenge the proximity 
of self-experience in the construction of subjectivity that lies at the foundation of 
contemporary economic, political and social forms of rationality and 
organization. Instead of relying solely on administrative interventions and 
remedies towards our problems, such as, price regulation and incentives, 
formulation of laws and public policy, etc, I believe that there is a great deal we 
can learn from the philosophical orientation of Buddhism concerning a set of 
practices of the self essentially different from the ones that traditionally influence 
and shape global discourses on politics and economics.  
Garfield (2002: 207) notes that “Buddhism neither precludes nor entails liberal 
democracy nor does it advocate a specific form of government.” The Buddha 
remained silent about such matters, except for the general guidelines that the 
goal of any social or political order is the maximization of happiness and 
minimization of suffering for all beings, and the cultivation of virtuous traits of 
character such as compassion, patience, generosity, wisdom and so forth. The 
                                                 
2 Foucault (1993: 203-204). 
3 Ibid. 
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contrast between the two respective orders is nevertheless real and can be 
properly emphasized in two ways: 
Liberal democratic theory legitimates its goods on procedural grounds; 
Buddhism legitimates any procedures on the grounds that they produce 
appropriate goods. Second, and related, procedures of particular kinds 
are constitutive of liberal democracy, whereas commitments to particular 
social goods are constitutive of Buddhist societies in very deep ways: 
whereas liberal democratic societies may differ widely (or one may 
change wildly over time) with respect to some particular vision of the 
good (say free education, universal health care, or a minimum wage) and 
remain recognizably democratic, any society that abandoned election, 
open access to offices, or transparency of the judicial process would ipso 
facto no longer count as liberal democracy. There is, however, also a 
sense in which a specific conception of the good is built into most 
Western liberal democracies beyond the necessary implication of some 
minimal conception of the good by the procedural commitments and the 
initial presuppositions of the contractual situation: most liberals – 
whether they acknowledge it or not – tacitly supplement democratic 
principles with a heavy dose of Judeo-Christian values, including the 
presumption of human domination over the earth, of the sanctity of 
individual property, of the primacy of individuals over collectives, of the 
legitimacy of violence in the service of a legitimate cause, among others.4 
Garfield (2002: 210) is keen to observe that Buddhism and liberal democracy are 
diametrically opposed on this issue, namely, “the direction of legitimation as 
between procedure and conception of the good.” Although he will go on and 
argue that they are capable not only of fusion, but compatible and 
complementary in a deep sense, I contend that there is another fundamental 
tension between the two that lies in the philosophical view of the individual. In 
Buddhism, while the individual is subject to ethical formulation and creative 
transformation, the ‘self’ per se is not a privileged subject of discourse,5 but a 
                                                 
4 Garfield (2002: 207). He concludes this section by noting that “any society that abandoned 
commitment to non-violence, to maintaining the welfare of the least advantaged, to providing health 
care and education to all its citizens, and to facilitating spiritual practice for those who aspire thereto 
would cease to be recognizably Buddhist.” 
5 Among western scholars, there have been a variety of approaches to the Buddhist understanding of 
self and its denial; for an informative examination see Collins (1994) and Tillemans (1996). 
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developmental response to ever-shifting causes and conditions in the social and 
natural world. It can be localized as an object of knowledge only in conventional 
terms and not in a metaphysical sense as an ‘owner of experiences,’ ‘a thinker of 
thoughts,’ and ‘an agent of actions.’ In this respect, the ‘self’ does not need to be 
discovered, according to some schools of psychoanalysis, in the dungeons of the 
unconscious; nor be incessantly interrogated to speak about itself in self-assuring 
monologues; or be incited to express its ‘true nature’ against the repression of an 
ostentatious social order. Rather, this sense of ‘I’ (the ego-self) arises and ceases 
like a reflection in a mirror in dependence on internal stimuli (thoughts, 
emotions) and external attractions (sense objects).  
The Ethical Management of Self: A Buddhist Approach  
Buddhism has much to offer to a gradual synthesis of ethical, social, and 
soteriological factors that at once define a set of transformative practices and 
methods while challenging our common perceptions of what constitutes an 
individual. Common to all Buddhist schools and traditions is a set of 
psychosomatic categories that constitute the ‘self.’ These are known as the five 
aggregates (khandhas): forms, feelings, perceptions, dispositional formations 
(habitual patterns of thinking, feeling, and acting) and consciousness. The first of 
the aggregates refers to six sense organs and their corresponding objects of 
perception – i.e., eye and the visible objects, ear and sounds, nose and smells, 
tongue and tastes, body and touchables, and also mind with its corresponding 
thoughts. The remaining four aggregates are mental processes, while all five 
constitute a complex of relations and experiences that makes up a person and 
each moment of self-experience. From a Buddhist perspective, there is nothing 
substantial to the five aggregates that are empirically subject to change from 
moment to moment. Any essential identification with them is misleading as is 
the notion of ‘ownership,’ which may be understood as a reflective mode of such 
identification. Clinging onto the notion of an unchanging and ongoing substance, 
compelled to think, feel, and act as though one had an inherent self to protect and 
preserve, is the very root of suffering. “The slightest encroachment on the self’s 
territory (a splinter in the finger, a noisy neighbour) arouses fear and anger. The 
slightest hope of self-enhancement (gain, praise, fame, pleasure) arouses greed 
and grasping. Any hint that a situation is irrelevant to the self (waiting for a bus, 
meditating) arouses boredom. Such impulses are instinctual, automatic, 
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pervasive, and powerful. They are completely taken for granted in daily life” 
(Varela 1993: 62).  
Essential to the understanding of how suffering arises by mistakenly identifying 
with the aggregates and fostering an objective sense of their ownership is 
detailed in the ‘Four Noble Truths.’ These are called ‘truths’ not as a matter of 
religious faith or doctrinal convention, but because their ‘truth value’ derives 
from empirically verifiable reflections of human experience. The first Noble 
Truth states that the human predicament is defined by lack of satisfaction and 
accompanying forms of suffering (dukkha). This is an experience shared 
regardless of one’s religious beliefs, social and ethnic status, and individual 
circumstances. Everyone, everywhere at some point suffers – at birth, in sickness 
and in death – but also when confronted with an infinite variety of 
psychophysical experiences including, but not limited to unfulfilled needs, 
failing aspirations, mental and emotional anguish, and physical discomfort.  
In the Dhammacakkappavattana-sutta (Setting in Motion the Wheel of Dharma), the 
Buddha proclaimed that lack of satisfaction is a pervasive human condition, but 
he did not single out an ‘I’ that suffers. This is a crucial point. Instead of 
highlighting a personal experience of suffering the Buddha avoided theorizing 
on a substantive ‘I’ outside the field of perception and experience, not unlike the 
thesis promoted by the Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711-1776) that ‘self 
identity’ is fiction.6 The field of neuroscience confirms the Buddhist view of the 
doctrine of ‘a non-localizable, non-substantial self’ (annatā) that has challenging 
implications not only for the cognitive sciences but also for economic theory 
(Zsolnai 2011). Significant is the work of Francisco Varela and others (1993) in a 
direction that frames the alienation of abstract individualism along the lines of 
believing in an essentialized, permanent and fixed self.  
                                                 
6 There are fruitful parallels between Buddhism and Hume on that matter, as noted by Lesser 
(1979:58): “[Hume concludes] that ‘[persons] are nothing but a bundle or collection of different 
perceptions which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in perpetual flux and 
movement.’…Buddhist writers typically make the same point by analyzing a person into the ‘Five 
Aggregates’ [khandhās]. Since a person is nothing more than the sum of these five aggregates, and 
since soul, in the sense of a permanent unchanging subject of consciousness [viz., the self], cannot be 
identified with one or more of the five, soul cannot exist…It seems clear that Hume and the Buddhists 
say the same thing for the same reasons: both analyze the ‘soul’ [viz., sense of self] into a series of 
events or processes, and do so because this is what experience reveals.” 
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Dispelling the fiction of an immutable self predisposes us to respond to life with 
a renewed humility and openness without channelling our quest for self 
knowledge into new forms of egocentric narcissism. It is evident, yet not fully 
explored, that our self-notions shape our cherished socio-political beliefs and 
expectations concerning the arrangement of our collective experiences and our 
participation as citizens of a planetary ecosystem that has felt the disastrous 
strains of unbridled consumerism. Long time ago, Veblen (1899) noted how our 
economic reality inspires us to channel our predatory impulses to achieve social 
status through consumption. Magnuson (2011: 98), commenting on Veblen’s 
work, notes a present-day circularity of self-serving thoughts informing our 
actions and our actions in turn informing our way of thinking about ourselves 
and the environment. He writes: “This ongoing, mutually reinforcing process 
becomes reified into institutional structures. These institutional structures evolve 
into systems, which control economic activity. In this way, economic activity can 
be directed in a pathological way, and at the same time reinforce pathological 
ways of thinking.”  
This brings us to the second Noble Truth that investigates the roots of 
dissatisfaction in our lives, which have much to do with an understanding of 
‘who we are’ as they do with the ways we talk or remain silent about it and 
which in turn reinforce our perception as suffering subjects. The origins of 
suffering are inseparable from our craving (tanha) ‘to become something or 
someone’ (bhava tanha), ‘to gratify sense pleasures’ (kama tanha), and to resort to 
all kinds of mental, emotional and physical stratagems to satisfy our desires and 
avoid that which is physically, mentally and emotionally unpleasant (vibhava 
tanha). Craving after self-gratification is never fulfilled in any ultimate or final 
way precisely because there is no self to occupy and fill with pleasure. The 
acknowledgement that suffering originates in ignorance of the relational nature 
of desire leads us to the third Noble Truth that states that “all that is subject to 
arising is also subject to ceasing.” In other words, dukkha ceases when we 
eradicate the cause of suffering – namely, ignorance in regards to desire’s mode 
of arising and ceasing. Individuals who do not pathologically cling onto a notion 
of a fixed identity are more apt to assess complex situations with clarity and be 
more effective in making decisions which are not overshadowed by destructive 
emotions and self-referential thoughts. They also enjoy a higher degree of 
happiness and contentment, for the “more bounded, unique and independent is 
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our sense of self, the more we tend to take personal responsibility and blame 
ourselves for failure to make the ‘right’ choice” (Ash 2007: 210).7 
Stated from another perspective, suffering is caused when our three root 
impulses, ‘passion/desire towards desirable objects,’ ‘aggression/anger towards 
undesirable objects,’ and ‘delusion/ignorance towards neutral objects,’ are 
essentialized and turn into greed (lobha), enmity (dosa), and deluded habits 
(moha). These ‘poisons’ affect individuals and their relations with others and they 
have implications for institutions, society and the natural world at large. As 
summarized by Helena Norberg-Hodge, the Director of International Society for 
Ecology and Culture, our actions need to ensure that politics shift from the 
‘virtues of products’ to the ‘virtues of people’: 
The three poisons of greed, hatred, and delusion are to some extent 
present in every human being, but cultural systems either encourage or 
discourage these traits. Today’s global consumer culture nurtures the 
three poisons on both an individual and societal level. At the moment, 
$450 billion is spent annually on advertising worldwide, with the aim of 
convincing three-year-old children that they need things they never 
knew existed, such as Coca-Cola and plastic Rambos with machine guns. 
Before the rise of consumerism, cultures existed in which this type of 
greed was virtually nonexistent. Thus we cannot conclude that the 
acquisitiveness and materialism of people trapped in the global 
economic system are an inevitable product of human nature. Instead we 
need to recognize the near impossibility of uncovering our Buddha 
natures in a global culture of consumerism and social atomization.8 
                                                 
7 Kriger and Seng (2005) building on the work of contingency leadership theorists, argued that 
effective leadership behaviour depends on four aspects namely: 1) on-going observation by the leader 
of subtle changes in his or her surrounding environment; 2) on-going real-time self-observation of the 
often subtle changes in the inner world of the leader (i.e., complex interactions among thoughts, 
feelings, intuitions, inspirations, and creative imagination); 3) an on-going aspiration to transcend the 
duality of “self” and “other” (to “self-actualize” in the terminology of Maslow); and 4) a deep wish to 
serve others to eliminate or decrease human suffering. 
8 Helena Norberg-Hodge (2001: 21). There have been several important studies published on the topic 
of Buddhist economics and ecology inspired by the pioneer work of E.F. Schumacher Small is 
Beautiful: Economics as if People Mattered (1973). In his important contribution to Buddhist economic 
theory, Payutto (1994: 42) comments that in classical economic models, unlimited desires are 
controlled by scarcity, but from a Buddhist perspective they are controlled by an appreciation of 
moderation and the objective of well-being. He explains that “when the goal of economic activity is 
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The fourth Noble Truth is prescriptive in that it outlines the practical means and 
methods for the cessation of the cause of ignorance and its accompanying forms 
of discontent. These means are subsumed in the ‘Eightfold Path,’ comprising 
eight stages of ethical management: 1) right view, 2) right intention, 3) right 
speech, 4) right action, 5) right livelihood, 6) right effort, 7) right mindfulness, 
and 8) right concentration. These aspects of self-practice do not form distinct 
disciplines in a hierarchical or sequential order. They are in mutual support to 
each other, while central to all is the right view of no-self, which leads to the 
development of wisdom (pañña). The notion of ‘right’ is here understood as the 
perfection of practice that stems from the union of application and knowledge, 
while all preoccupations, beliefs and actions informed by the existence of a 
perpetual self are wrong views (micchādii). The five aggregates that represent 
all the psycho-physical aspects of individuality bear the characteristics of 
impermanence, suffering and mutability and therefore cannot be taken as 
permanent substances; they are anatta (no-self). A person holding wrong views 
concerning the aggregates will not be released from suffering and suffer precisely 
for holding such mistaken conceptions. More on this point the Buddha defined 
six wrong views (MN. I.2): “There is self existing in me, there is self not existing 
in me, I recognize self as self, I recognize self as not-self, I recognize not self as 
self, the self which exists in me and which feels, experiences here and there the 
fruition of good and bad deeds, is permanent, stable, eternal and unchangeable.” 
The cultivation of right intention is based on good will, non-violence and non-
attachment. As for right speech in the Abhaya Sutta (MN 58), the Buddha instructs 
Prince Abhaya when it is proper not to speak at all, and when it is proper to 
speak only at the right time. Concerning remaining silent: “In the case of words 
that the Tathagata knows to be unfactual, untrue, unbeneficial, unendearing and 
disagreeable to others, he does not say them. In the case of words that the 
Tathagata knows to be factual, true, unbeneficial, unendearing and disagreeable 
to others, he does not say them. In the case of words that the Tathagata knows to 
be unfactual, untrue, unbeneficial, but endearing and agreeable to others, he does 
not say them. In the case of words that the Tathagata knows to be factual, true, 
unbeneficial, but endearing and agreeable to others, he does not say them.” In all 
                                                                                                                         
seen to be the satisfaction of desires, economic activity is open ended and without clear definition-
desires are endless. According to the Buddhist approach, economic activity must be controlled by the 
qualification that it is directed to the attainment of well-being rather than the “maximum satisfaction” 
sought after by traditional economic thinking.” 
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other cases, the proper time of speaking ought to be observed: “In the case of 
words that the Tathagata knows to be factual, true, beneficial, but unendearing 
and disagreeable to others, he has a sense of the proper time for saying them. In 
the case of words that the Tathagata knows to be factual, true, beneficial, and 
endearing and agreeable to others, he has a sense of the proper time for saying 
them.”9 Central to the discourse of right speech is sensitivity towards the effect 
language has on others. Nowhere is it expressed that what is endearing but 
untrue should be uttered – in other words, freedom of speech is not free of 
responsibility.  
The practice of morality (sīla) is dependent on right speech, right action (i.e., 
abstaining from killing, stealing and sexual misconduct), and right livelihood 
that precludes making profit from occupations that harm sentient beings. Five 
inappropriate ways of making a living are listed in the Vanijja Sutta (AN 5.177): 
1) commerce in weapons and instruments of killing; 2) trading in human beings 
(slavery, prostitution, etc); 3) trading in animals for meat consumption, including 
breeding them for that purpose; 4) manufacturing and selling intoxicants, drugs 
and alcohol; and 5) trading in poisons or substances whose purpose is to kill.  
Lastly, right effort or endeavour requires making a conscious effort to forsake 
harmful thoughts, speech and actions, and prevent their habitual or new arising. 
At the same time it entails cultivating virtuous qualities that have not arisen and 
sustaining those which are present. Right mindfulness necessitates familiarizing 
oneself with a vigilant yet detached observation of physical and mental 
phenomena as they arise and subside in the present moment, while right 
concentration entails withdrawing from unwholesome mental attitudes, stilling 
thoughts and judgments, and remaining mindful, balanced and alert with 
internal assurance. Right effort, mindfulness and concentration lead to mental 
stability and meditation (samādhi).  
At the crux of the matter are misleading views of individuality perpetuated in 
social and ideological mechanisms, and in political and economic institutions. A 
Buddhist approach challenges Cartesian dualism that divides the word between 
self and other, and assigns the individual a monadic consciousness alienated and 
detached from the larger contexts from where he emerges, and on which his 
happiness and prosperity depends upon. The absence of an essentialist concept 
                                                 
9 Translated from Pali by Thanissaro Bhikkhu. 
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of self does not lead to nihilism or radical relativism, but makes the cultivation of 
individuality possible as the by-product of human discipline and effort, while 
self-control and agency are not theorized outside the path of cultivation. Unlike 
Western liberal political thought where humans are abstract bearers of particular 
rights, in Buddhism individuals are relational, context-embedded beings where 
these abstract rights may be of little consequence if they do not correspond to a 
pragmatic goal that leads to harmonious co-existence with others and freedom 
from suffering.  
The Bodhisattva Training: The Discipline of Self as Altruistic Practice 
The training of the bodhisattva, from Sanskrit a ‘being geared toward 
awakening’ offers an integrated model for self cultivation as a form of altruistic 
practice. In Mahāyāna contexts, a bodhisattva trains in six types of disciplines 
known as pāramitā, a term that has been commonly translated as perfections. The 
Eightfold Path is included in the six perfections and there are many 
interpretations of the pāramitā relevant to different life aspects and activities. 
Here I have divided them in two groups insofar as the first three require the 
presence of others for their perfection and the last three concern self-application. 
This division is arguably artificial, but it may well serve the purpose of 
illustrating an eventual synthesis at a later stage of integration where self and 
other are no longer conceived as immutable structures in competition or 
symbiosis with each other, but as operational categories in a nexus of intentional 
and unintentional interactions.10  
A. Perfecting oneself through the other  
The Discipline of generosity, giving of oneself (Skt. dāna) 
The acknowledgement of the first Noble Truth may trigger empathy and 
compassion not just towards friends and family, but also towards strangers and 
foes, since everyone regardless of their relationship to us experiences suffering at 
different times and at various degrees of intensity. Hence, equanimity should 
guide the discipline of giving that may include material assistance (i.e., money, 
                                                 
10 While both Śravakayāna and Bodhisattvayāna schools agree on the conventional existence of self, 
they radically differ on the necessity for there to be anything, like the elements (or dharmas) which 
are said to exist substantially. Although these are important philosophical differences, they do not 
bear in the overall argument of this paper.  
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food, shelter), providing services in the form of sharing knowledge, 
understanding and empathy, and also offering protection to those who are 
afraid, require protection such as, children, elderly, animals, and so forth. Like all 
disciplines this one is practiced to perfection when it is executed with a mind free 
from ulterior motives, expectations and self-recognition. Generally, there are two 
types of advantages in the perfection of the discipline of generosity: 1) being of 
service and benefit to others, and 2) cultivating non-attachment towards one’s 
own possessions and accomplishments and thus minimizing the poisons of greed 
and miserliness. It also implies placing others before oneself, offering with 
generosity one’s time, being available and sensitive to their needs and upholding 
the most skilful means to bring about their welfare.  
The Discipline of morality and proper conduct (Skt. śīla) 
Generally there are two aspects of morality: avoiding negative actions, thoughts 
and speech which are harmful to self and other, and cultivating what is positive 
and constructive. There are many ways of discussing the importance of ethical 
discipline for the welfare of individuals embedded in communities and the 
physical environment. Morality applies equally to thought-patterns, speech-acts 
and physical actions, and there is a variety of ways for developing moral 
sensibility in these respects. Generally speaking, the practice of morality involves 
avoiding ten unwholesome actions: 1) killing sentient life-forms; 2) taking what 
was not given; 3) engaging in sexual misconduct; 4) lying; 5) giving into divisive 
speech; 6) speaking harshly; 7) chattering with frivolity; 8) harbouring covetous 
thoughts; 9) having hostile thoughts; and 10) holding onto false views about the 
self and the world. The notion of ‘karma,’ which means both ‘action’ and 
‘intention’ plays an important role in Buddhist discourses on morality, for it 
prescribes consequences to every gross and subtle action. The Buddha stated: “It 
is intention (cetanā) monks, that I call karma; intending one does karma through 
body, speech, or mind” (Aguttara Nikāya, III, 410).  
The Discipline of patience, tolerance and forbearance (Skt. kānti) 
The importance of being tolerant and acceptant of different opinions and 
maintaining flexibility in one’s dealings with others are vital qualities of the 
discipline of patience. Patience also implies forbearance in the face of obstacles, 
opposition and frictions that rise during the course of daily life; carrying on 
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despite difficulties without loosing our composure and inner tranquility, and 
being free of resentment, irritation, or retaliation. Feeling grateful for the lessons 
one receive from others contributes to the development of tolerance and it is 
fundamentally a non-violent approach to conflict resolution. It is a method for 
developing objectivity towards oneself and others equally. 
B. Self-perfection with effort and through awareness   
The Discipline of diligence and effort (Skt. vīrya) 
Diligence is an antidote to laziness and despair. It implies a consistent level of 
inspiration for discovering new things and for exerting and maintaining a 
driving force, zeal and sufficient energy to complete tasks and accomplish the 
responsibilities entrusted in one’s post and during one’s life. Perseverance, 
endurance and fortitude are virtues subsumed in this discipline and are essential 
qualities for learning, self-development and seeing things to an end.  
The Discipline of one-pointed concentration (Skt. dhyāna) 
This training requires maintaining concentration and mindfulness during one’s 
work, learning not to get distracted by surrounding events or by one’s inner 
thoughts and emotions. Through a peaceful and steady mind, we can easily 
accomplish our objectives. In the Buddhist teachings, there are numerous 
meditation techniques for cultivating mastery over one self, learning to be 
unmoved by external distractions and maintaining ‘inner peace’ regardless of the 
ways phenomena appear in the world and in one’s own mind. Essential to all 
mindfulness techniques is the observation of one’s experiences (mental, 
emotional or physical) as discontinuous and momentary. A moment of 
consciousness arises, dwells for an instance and then it vanishes only to be 
replaced by the next moment of consciousness. We do not need to have faith in 
Buddhism to justify this kind of perceptual framing. It is validated by experience. 
The Discipline of wisdom (Skt. prajñā) 
This is no ordinary wisdom that comes through age and experience, but one that 
arises through investigating, recognizing and accepting reality as it is without 
being carried away by the deception of the physical senses and our mental 
fabrications of how things should be. In its practice this is the most crucial of 
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disciplines for it properly informs the other five by relinquishing false notions 
concerning the self and the world as two events that occur independently of one 
another. At the heart of the perfection of the discipline of wisdom is the 
acceptance that phenomena, in an ultimate sense, neither arise nor cease. 
“Moment by moment, new experiences happen and are gone. It is a rapidly 
shifting stream of momentary mental occurrences. Furthermore, the shiftness 
includes the perceiver as much as the perception. There is no experiencer, no 
landing platform for experiences” (Varela, Thomson and Rosch, 1991: 60). This is 
a radical break from substantializing thinking and an active proscription towards 
cultivating mindfulness and awareness of the present. It generally has three 
stages of training: at first one has to listen, learn and rely on the authority of 
expert testimony of those proficient in these methods; the second relies on the 
application of inference and logical reasoning; and the third relies on direct 
experience that usually comes through meditation and single-pointed 
concentration into the nature of reality (Conze 1975: 164).  
When the pāramitā of wisdom is refined, all other disciplines are perfected by 
minimizing vested interest, which is to say they are performed without clinging 
unto a notion of doer, a notion of doing, and the notion that something has been 
done. The awareness that the nature of interactions in which the self engages 
actually changes the structure of perception allows for a more textured 
understanding of our mental processes, while conceptions of ‘self’ and ‘other’ are 
exposed as dual constructions of a singular perceptual process.  
With the recognition of previously unperceived patterns of conditioning in which 
the self is implicated, the possibility of cognitive transformation is made possible 
and personal growth is enhanced. As the barriers between mind and self-
interpretive contexts are challenged, causes and their effects, things and their 
attributes, and the mind of the inquiring subject and its object are seen to be 
equally co-dependent on the other. These insights are articulated in detail in the 
Śrāvakayāna and Bodhisattvayāna teachings, and especially in the work of the 
Mahāyāna philosopher Acharya Nāgārjuna. In the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, on the 
chapter on causality (1:1), he succinctly states: “Neither from itself nor from 
another, nor from both, nor without a cause, does anything whatever, anywhere 
arise.” In other words, no thing, aspect or attribute exists autonomously solely by 
virtue of its own nature, or being. This is a reformulation of the doctrine of 
psychophysical causation, or co-dependent origination (paiccasamuppāda), a 
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cardinal teaching of the Buddha that denies the possibility of any permanent 
substance.11  
The philosophical implications of the doctrine of emptiness and dependent 
origination are far too many and fall beyond the scope of this paper.  
Nevertheless, the luck of fixed substances in the world implies that there is a 
good chance that expanded forms of consciousness and higher-order of thinking 
can emerge in all of us despite rival claims held by theories of social or biological 
determinism. Emptiness is no other than the condition and promise for fullness. 
The interdependence and mutual conditioning of phenomena suggests that 
people have an effect on their environment not only by their physical actions, but 
also through their mental attitudes, what in some schools of thought has been 
called “cognitive autopoiesis.”12 In every act of understanding there is, 
potentially or partially, an evocative power to influence one’s surroundings in 
concrete and tangible ways. The inverse holds true as one’s environment may 
have a positive or negative effect on one’s actions and mental dispositions. In fact 
their deep-rooted interrelation is conventionally translated through the concept 
of causation (karma), which can be worked out in both positive and negative 
consequences. Karma is a process of intention that gives rise to volitional action, 
the accumulation of effects, tendencies and responses, both wholesome and 
unwholesome. Awareness of one’s intention may serve as a direct method to cut 
the chain of repetitive patterns of suffering and one’s conditional and compulsive 
mode of arising.  
From Self to Selflessness and Back: The Relational Self  
We must die as egos and be born 
Again in the swarm, not separate and self-hypnotized 
But individual and related. 
(Henry Miller, Sexus). 
                                                 
11 Majjhima Nikāya (28): “Whoever sees dependent co-arising sees the doctrine.” The truth of the 
conditioned production of suffering (sasāra) is philosophically elaborated through the standard 
formulation of the twelve-link origination which, according to the Buddhist tradition, the Buddha 
discovered during the night of his enlightenment. He recognized that in its reverse order it revealed 
the way to liberation from discomfort (nirvāa). Thus, the standard presentation of the twelvefold 
formula explains the second noble truth, namely that there is discontent, its reverse enumeration 
explains the fourth noble truth, namely that there is a path that leads beyond frustration. 
12 For Varela et al (1980) and in subsequent publications the concept of autopoiesis (Grk. for self-
creation) has been increasingly associated with cognition. 
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Current economic and political models uphold personal freedom on the grounds 
that society exists for the fulfilment of the individual defined according to 
universal rights. Following this reasoning, social, political and economic 
institutions are created by man as a necessary institutional framework within 
which the individual formulates, pursues and protects his own goals. The much 
vaunted freedom of choice characteristic of Western society is grounded 
therefore, in a concept of self according to which an individual regulates his 
conduct and shapes his choices according to his own perceived needs and wants 
with little interest towards the needs of his family, community and the natural 
world. If the relationship between the personal, social and political ‘self’ can be 
more clearly delineated, then the processes of socialization, political 
development and liberal democracy may become better understood both in their 
obvious benefits and unseen shortcomings. Payutto (1994b: 8-9) notes that in our 
current democratic climate, we tend to give more attention to our rights and 
liberties, and “we forget that there are duties required of us.” He explains that 
“rights must arise with duties, and those who perform their duties will value 
their rights highly. It is the duty of a democratic government to create an 
awareness of the importance of duties, so that people understand that rights 
obtained are to be offset by duties performed.” 
In my paper, I have attempted to introduce the concept of the individual from a 
Buddhist perspective, and it might be useful to summarize some of the different 
levels of analysis implied by such a concept. The study of self in Buddhism 
requires a multileveled approach, for understanding at any one level should be 
compared and eventually reconciled with all other levels. At the beginning level 
of analysis, we acknowledge active human agents in society. This seems so basic 
and it goes without saying - after all, every known community seems to have 
found it necessary to assign distinct names and responsibility to its members. 
However, this type of investigation is only a first step and takes us almost 
nowhere. Both in Buddhism and in western models, the individual must be 
conceived to be capable of motivated action and initiating decisions; in other 
words, the individual must constitute a locus capable of action. As argued by 
Collins (1994: 67), “one might say that human beings are articulated conceptually 
as agents, by themselves and in relation to each other, in different ways, in 
different discourses.” Nevertheless, the notion of the individual’s volition does 
not turn him into an independent and substantial entity. The mind and the 
physical body of man are not understood as singular units but as the by-
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production of aggregates arising according to causes and conditions.  The sense 
of relative individuality that emerges must be ‘illuminated from within’; that is to 
say, it is crucial that the individual becomes aware of what he designates as self 
and by extension his actions which are predicated or capable of being predicated 
upon this notion of self or I. At a deeper level of analysis, the emptiness of self is 
not merely a discovery but a discipline. When one’s awareness looks upon itself, 
it realizes that there is no hidden substance or self lurking in or beyond the 
process of investigation, and that it cannot be affected in any fundamental way 
from the objects that manifest within the cognitive field. Becoming cognizant of 
the cognitive act is a basic activity of intelligent systems, but when one correctly 
understands the cognitive process as a conditioned phenomenon, one abandons 
a self-centred investigation into the past, present and future. The Buddhist 
teachings provide a variety of skilful techniques to illustrate how cognition 
shapes our perception of the world rather than reflecting a fixed external reality 
already in existence. The examination of oneself through mindfulness/awareness 
meditation is devoid of the practice of confession as there is no hidden subject to 
be discovered, purged or freed, but the very process of being conscious of the self 
emerging as a relational process of the five aggregates. 
I have attempted to show that a nuanced reading of Buddhist scriptures does not 
centre on a false dichotomy between self and non-self, but rather on the species 
of individuality that are possible and desirable following the application of the 
teachings on selflessness and impermanence. The phrase ‘self-conscious’ is 
appropriate if by this we understand that it is at this point that the individual 
begins to clearly differentiate between an unimpeded field of awareness (Skt. 
nirvāa) on the one hand, and notions of individuality reified by craving and 
clinging after elusive and impermanent phenomena (Skt. sasāra), on the other. 
The ethical training outlined in the ‘eightfold path’ and the ‘six pāramitā’ is 
particularly important in that it allows for a holistic intervention against false 
attributions of agency and possession towards people and things that lack both 
capacities, while dispelling behaviours that result from acting in accordance to 
misleading attributions.  
The combination of these approaches to the subject of individuality yields the 
type of view we may label as the discipline of the ‘relational self’ embodying a 
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concept of the self in an interdependent and expanded sense.13 ‘Relational-model’ 
theories of mind have been described by Mitchell (1988:3-4) as follows:  
In this vision, the basic unit of study is not the individual as a separate 
entity whose desires clash with an external reality, but an interactional 
field within which the individual arises and struggles to make contact 
and articulate himself. Desire is experienced always in the context of 
relatedness, and it is that context which defines meaning. Mind is 
composed of relational configurations… Experience is understood as 
structured through interactions.  
What may emerge from our observations of a Buddhist notion of a ‘centerless 
self,’ is the production of a ‘relational self’ dependent upon causal operations that 
manifest in changing contexts and along ever-shifting connections transpiring in 
the natural and social world. These ways of looking and assessing our individual 
subjectivity bear implications beyond the fields of psychology and cognitive 
studies. The discourse on selflessness is very much a prescriptive discourse on 
self-cultivation, renunciation and liberation from bondage that is suffering. One 
cannot theoretically recreate or anticipate the results of personal and social 
transformation, one has to embody the transformation and experience the world 
through it. The self-abandoning/self-cultivating approach of Buddhism offers a 
fundamental challenge to existing models of individuality and the politics of self 
as constructed by consumer-based structures operating under the banner of 
democracy. The ideas, beliefs and dogmas that we hold about who we are, are in 
fact not restricted to the level of ideology. They figure at the source of our present 
environmental, economic and social crises in that they reflect in direct and 
concrete ways the kinds of systems (educational, social and political) we support 
willingly or unwillingly, consciously or unconsciously. Foucault’s comments in 
the preface to Gilles Deleuze’s Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (xiiil) 
resonate with some of the concerns that we addressed here:  
Do not demand of politics that it restore the ‘rights’ of the individual, as 
philosophy had defined them. The individual is the product of power. 
What is needed is to ‘de-individualize’ by means of multiplication and 
displacement, diverse combinations. The group must not be the organic 
                                                 
13 The concept of ‘relational self’ has been used by several heterogeneous schools of psychoanalysis; 
for a discussion of related literature and debates, see Schapiro (1994). 
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bond uniting hierarchized individuals, but a constant generator of 
deindividualization.  
The starting point for social change in a democratic system cannot rest on the 
demands we place on governing others, but on the demands we place on 
defining and governing ourselves. In other words, the self is not defined 
according to its civil rights and right to liberty, but as a liberating discipline and 
form of practice. 
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